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Initially halt all new
bank lending. This does not stop all lending.
Non-bank financial institutions may continue to lend.
But banks are not to guarantee any loans or engage
in any form of off-balance sheet lending. This rule applies
equally to the central bank, except to the extent that it lends
foreign reserves to commercial banks to facilitate foreign
exchange transactions. The government may borrow by
issuing bonds but the central bank and commercial banks are
not to purchase those bonds. Removes
excess demand so that imports do not exceed exports and
limits inflationary pressures.
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At the same time, fix the
value of the currency to basket of currencies at a value
significantly below the current market rate.
Raises demand for domestic products, reduces
demand for imports, raises export incomes and provides a net
injection of funds into the economy without the need for further
fiscal deficit, discourages capital outflow, provides
certainty to the economy as to the value of the currency.
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Require banks to
establish a foreign reserve account with the central bank,
into which commercial banks deposit foreign exchange,
surplus to their day to day requirements. Provides
a saving base and prime assets to which future lending can
be linked.
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If commercial banks
require foreign exchange, the central bank should lend the
foreign funds through this foreign reserve account.
Provides the
commercial banks with the capability to continue to
facilitate overseas transactions. This facility is
unlikely to be required once stability has returned to the
monetary system.
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Require banks to make
inter-bank settlements through their foreign reserve
account.
This provides equity
(justice) for future lending capacity and will encourage
banks to compete for deposits and so reward savings.
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Require commercial bank
purchases of domestic notes and coins to be made in foreign
exchange (from the foreign reserve account).
Conversely, the central bank is to buy domestic currency
with foreign exchange. Provides
central bank with foreign reserves to back the domestic
currency and gives certainty to the value of domestic
currency.
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Once banks start
depositing surplus funds in the foreign reserve accounts and
raising foreign reserves (so that the foreign exchange
deposited exceeds any foreign exchange loans provided to
banks by the Reserve Bank), allow banks to maintain current
lending levels; that is, the central bank allocates
a lending limit to each commercial bank and allows them to lend up
to that limit. Means
that banks can lend the equivalent of what is repaid to
them. It restarts bank lending in the economy when stability
has been shown to have returned to the monetary system and
it avoids a further leakage of funds from the economy that
could cause a recession.
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When foreign reserves
have proven to be growing, allow the banks to
increase their lending capacity, but only by as much as the
growth in the deposits in their foreign exchange accounts
less any growth in the bank's foreign debt.
Allows growth in commercial bank lending but
not so much as to cause foreign reserves to be depleted or
foreign debt to increase. Excessive commercial bank lending
would deplete the banks' deposits in their foreign reserve
accounts or raise the banks' foreign debt, curtailing any
further increase in bank lending. Hence commercial banks
can lend only as national savings increase.
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Once stability is proven,
start relaxing lending constraints. Allow banks to increase
their lending capacity by, say, $5 for every $1 increase in
their net foreign reserves (deposits in their foreign
reserve account less any increase in bank's foreign debt),
provided inflation does not exceed the target level, say,
3%. For every 1% that inflation exceeds the target
(of 3%),
the amount banks can lend for each $1 increase in the
foreign reserve account is reduced by $1. Hence, if
inflation were 5%, banks would be able to increase their
lending capacity by $3 for every $1 increase in net foreign
reserves. Provides monetary growth to
stimulate the economy in such a way that it does not deplete
foreign reserves. Provides an incentive to banks to avoid
lending that may be inflationary as this would curtail
future lending.
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Once price monetary
stability has been established, allow the exchange rate to float
initially between pegged limits. Retain the same foreign reserve
requirement and continue to use the limit on bank lending to target inflation but
link lending to a foreign currency unit such as IMF
Statutory Reserve Deposits (SDRs) so that banks are not
rewarded with additional lending capacity for devaluing
the currency. For example, banks may be allowed to lend
$8 for every SDR1 increase in their net foreign reserves. Transitional
step to the resumption of a variable exchange rate system.
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Before removing pegged
exchange rate limits, introduce a new employment target,
allowing banks to increase their lending capacity if
unemployment is reduced. For example, if unemployment were
4% and the target rate were 2%, allow the banks to lend $10
for every SDR1 increase in foreign reserves but reduce it by
$1 for every 1% that unemployment exceeds the target level
of full employment. Allows the banks to continue to
lending at same levels (say $8 for every SDR1 increase in their net foreign
reserves), but provides bank with an incentive to push the exchange
rate to a level that would achieve full employment but
at a speed that would retain low inflation.
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Keep moving the pegs on
the exchange rate. When the pegs are no longer binding
remove them completely. The monetary system
should now be stable with rising foreign reserves,
price stability and economic growth targeted to achieve full
employment.
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Extend
the definition of net foreign reserves to include the
reduction of bank foreign debt. Rewards banks
that reduce
their net foreign debt, not only those that increase foreign
reserves. These are both forms of increasing national
savings.